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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ELIZABETH FRANDSEN TRINNAMAN
and CHERYL FRANDSEN GRIFFITHS,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs.

EDITH S. CLINGER and HERSCHEL J.
CLINGER,

Case No.
12302

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Action by heirs to set aside sale of property by
self-dealing Executrix and to require an accounting
and damages resulting therefrom.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The court received only evidence touching
upon the relationship of the parties and the nature
of the sale, continued the hearing to receive evidence going to the question of an accounting or
damages (Tr. 67) and entered a summary judgment
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against the heirs based upon the running of the
statute of limitations against the heirs during their
minority.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have the summary judgment
of dismissal set aside, instructions to the lower court
to set aside the sale of properties remaining in the
hands of the defendants as of the filing of this action
and restoring same to the plaintiffs, and requiring
an accounting by the defendants and an award of
damages to the plaintiffs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ellen Frandsen died in Provo on December 2,
1950. She left surviving her, her husband Calvin E.
Frandsen, and two infant daughters, Cheryl, then
three and one-half years of age and Elizabeth, then
one and one-half years of age (R. 46). Cheryl was
born on July 31, 1947 (Tr. 81), and Elizabeth was
born on July 30, 1949 (Tr. 77).
About one month prior to her death, the deceased executed a Last Will and Testament wherein she left one dollar to her husband; shares of stock
in the First National Bank of Moab to her brother,
James M. Scorup, to her sisters, Ruth S. Clegg and
Edith S. Clinger and to Rhoda H. Gibson; and all
the rest residue and remainder of the estate she left
in trust for her two children, Cheryl and Elizabeth.
Defendant, Edith S. Clinger, sister of the testatrix,
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was designated in the will as Executrix of the estate,
guardian of the children and trustee of their estates
during their respective minorities (R. 46).
The will was admitted to probate by order of
the court in Probate No. 10007, December 22, 1950,
and defendant, Edith S. Clinger, was duly appointed
Executrix of the will. The estate was appraised at
just over $63,000.00 and consisted generally of a
house and a lot at Moab, Utah, some cash, capital
stock in the First National Bank of Moab and an undivided one-half interest in property situated in
Sevier County, Utah, with nine shares of water stock
(R. 46).
The other undivided one-half interest in the
property in Sevier County and the water stock was
owned by the defendant, Edith S. Clinger. (Tr. 37-40)
The defendants have at all times mentioned
herein held the relationship of husband and wife.
(R. 11, 19)
The property in Moab, Utah, was appraised at
$6,100.00 and sold by contract by the Executrix to
an apparently disinterested third person for $6,500.00 on September 21, 1951(R.46).
The estate's one-half interest in the property in
Sevier County, subject of this lawsuit, was appraised
as follows:
(a)
(b)

House and Lot in Salina
Household furnishings in
house in Salina

$1,750.00
100.00
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( c)
(d)
( e)

Unimproved Lot in Salina
Approximately 20 acres of
farm land near Salina
Nine shares of Salina Creek
Irrigation Co.

400.00
1,750.00
675.00

The appraised values of the one-half interest of the
estate in the foregoing properties will be seen to
total $4,675.00 (R. 46).
On September 17, 1951, Edith S. Clinger, Executrix, by contract sold the estate's one-half interest
in the Sevier County properties to "Herschel J.
Clinger" for the appraised value of $4,675.00 (R. 46).
A petition for confirmation of the two sales, i.e.
the Moab property for $6,500.00 and the Sevier
County properties for $4,675.00 was filed on October
6, 1951. A copy of the contract concerning the Moab
property was attached to the petition marked Exhibit "A". A copy of the contract concerning the
Sevier County properties was attached to the petition marked Exhibit "B'' (R. 46).
Neither the contract of sale of the Sevier County properties and stock to "Herschel J. Clinger" nor
the petition for confirmation of said sale disclosed
the fact that the Executrix and "Herschel J. Clinger"
were husband and wife or the fact that the Executrix
was the owner of the other one-half interest of the
properties (R. 11, 19).
The petition for confirmation did make the following representations to the court:
" ... because of the joint ownership of the
property . . . the title thereto and the opera-
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tion of the property are subject to legal complications, resulting in reduced income and
sales values;"
" ... the property ... can be sold at the
present time for its full appraised value to
Herschel J. Clinger on a title retaining contract, the purchase price being payable
$475.00 cash, and the balance of the purchase
price payable at the rate of $40.00 or more
per month, with interest on the unpaid balance
at the rate of six percent per annum;"
"that the net income to the estate will be
greater by having the money invested in the
said Sevier County property loaned and bearing interest than by the collection of rentals
from the said property and paying the expenses thereof;"
"and that the administration of the estate
will be facilitated by converting the estate to
cash and loaning the money on good security."
(R. 46)

The petition for confirmation was heard on October 19, 1951. The clerk's minute entry makes reference to Exhibit "A" (the contract regarding the
Moab property) being marked and received in evidence and bids being called for, but makes no
reference to Exhibit "B'' or the Sevier County property (R. 49).
Demonstrating the extent to which the court was
not informed, the court recited in its Order confirming said sale, dated October 19, 1951:
" ... income from rentals on said property
is uncertain; that greater net returns from the
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investment can be made by loaning the equivalent amount on good security at interest; and
that the title to the Sevier County property is
complicated by being held as a tenancy in common with another person;" (emphasis added)
(R. 46)

In the order of October 19, 1951, Calvin E.
Frandsen, the husband of the deceased and father
of the plaintiffs in this action, was awarded a settlement from the estate based upon his claim of curtesy. He appears not to have been at the hearing
(Tr. 93) but was represented by counsel (R. 46).
Nearly one and one-half years later when the
girls were 5 Yz and 3 Yz years of age, respectively,
Calvin E. Frandsen was, in a separate proceeding,
appointed general guardian of his infant daughters
by order of the court dated February 6, 1953. (R. 48).
He gave no notice to Edith S. Clinger and he made
no further filings with the court in that guardianship
proceeding. Edith never distributed estate property
to him on behalf of said minors, but she herself
acted as trustee and guardian of the estate of said
minor heirs until their respective majorities (Tr. 58;
R. 46).
After paying $550.59 in interest on said contract
over a period of approximately 25 months, Edith S.
Clinger and Herschel J. Clinger paid the balance
of the contract in full. Edith testified that this was
because she never liked to make monthly payments
(Tr. 64). The money was probably placed in a passbook savings account at the First Security Bank in
Provo (Tr. 64). There it received interest at the ap-
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proximate rates of two percent per annum from 1954
through 1955; two and one half percent per annum
during 1956; three percent per annum from 1957
through 1961; and four percent per annum from
1962 to 1967. (R. 46)
Plaintiffs did not discover the fraud or lawful
ground upon which this action is based until December of 1969, approximately one month prior to
the filing of the complaint. They never learned that
Edith had owned one-half interest in said property
or that their mother's one-half interest had been sold
by Edith to Herschel J. Clinger until approximately
one month prior to the filing of the Complaint herein. (Tr. 69, 81)
Defendants have in substance admitted each
allegation of plaintiffs' complaint (R. 11, 19), but
allege "on information and belief" that the court was
aware of said facts, that there was no intent to withhold information from the court and that at all times
"defendant, Edith S. Clinger, as Executrix and
Guardian acted in entire good faith and in the best
interests of the beneficiaries of her trust." (emphasis
added) (R. 11, 19)
At all times since said sale both defendants
have had and exercised an equal interest in the
properties subject of the said sale. (R. 12, 19 and Tr.
62-64)
With respect to the 20 acres of unimproved,
fenced farm land near Salina, Utah, said land benefits from the nine shares of water in Salina Creek
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Irrigation Co. Said acreage has been rented to the
same person continuously to the present and from
a date preceding the death of Ellen S. Frandsen.
The renter has at all times mentioned, at his expense, fully maintained said land and fences and
paid $400.00 annually. The only expense to the
owner has been the yearly payment of property tax
(Tr. 45-57). Said 20 acres remain at the present in
the possession of the defendants less only approximately 1.4 acres sold by the defendants to the State
of Utah in 1969 for $580.00 (R. 12).
By Answer and later by Amended Answer, the
defendants admitted the allegation of paragraph
eleven of plaintiffs' complaint to the effect that said
sale was in violation of the provisions of 75-10-6,
Utah Code Annotated (R. 11, 19).
By Answer and later by Amended Answer, defendants raised only the technical defense of
estoppel, laches, statute of limitations and a claim
that the matters were res judicata (R. 11, 19).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE SALE OF ESTATE
PROPERTY BY THE EXECUTRIX TO THE EXECUTRIX'S HUSBAND WAS IMPROPER AND SHOULD
BE SET ASIDE TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE AND THE
DEFENDANT, EDITH S. CLINGER, REQUIRED TO
ACCOUNT AND PAY DAMAGS.

The undisputed evidence herein indicates that
on or about September 17, 1951, defendant, Edith
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S. Clinger, as Executrix of the estate of Ellen S.
Frandsen, sold the estate's one-half interest in the
Sevier County properties to the Executrix's own
husband, Herschel J. Clinger, for the sum of the
appraised value of the property. (R. 46) At the time
of this sale no guardian for the children had been
appointed and both plaintiffs at that time were
minors under the age of five years.
Section 75-10-6 of the Utah Code Annotated,
1953, (which was Section 102-10-8 at the time of the
sale relevant hereto) states:
"Personal representative cannot be purchaser or
interested.-No executor or administrator shall,
directly or indirectly, purchase any property
of the estate he represents, nor be interested in
any sale."
In re Smith's Estate, Davies v. Smith, 108 Utah 537,

162 P.2d 105 (1945) involved a contest between the
heirs and the Executor. The evidence indicated that
the Executor personally purchased produce from
the estate's farm. This Court held that the purchase
of the estate produce by the Executor in his individual capacity directly violated the precursor of Section 75-10-6. Id. at 542, 162 P.2d at 108.
In the early decision of Haight v. Pearson, 11 Utah
51, 39 P. 479 (1895) this court expressed the underlying purpose and policy of the precursor of the
present statute:
"We are of [the] opinion that this statute
simply declares, in the case of executors and
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administrators, that which was, long before the
statutes, a rule in equity, to wit: 'that contracts in which a trustee both buys and sells
to himself are void.'" Id. at 56-57, 39 P. at 480.

Although that case, and the case of Norton v.
Fuller, 68 Utah 524, 528, 251 P. 29, 30 (1926), indicate
that sales by an heir to an executor do not come within the
statute if the transaction is fair, nevertheless, in situations such as the case at bar, where the executor
sells estate property to himself or his spouse, the
purpose and language of the statute seem clearly
violated, and Smith's Estate seem to so hold.
The general rules in the major legal encyclopedias and the authorities cited therein are consistent with the Utah cases mentioned. In 31 Am Jur 2d
Executors and Administrators § 383, p. 186 (1967) it is indicated:
"With some exceptions, the rule is that an executor or administrator, at his own sale, may
not purchase property belonging to the
decedent's estate. The rule prevents the unfairness that is apt to infect a sale in which
the same person is vendor and purchaser. The
presence of actual fraud in the transaction is
not necessary to support a decree vitiating the
sale. The absence of moral turpitude on the
part of the purchaser and his absolute good
faith are alike ineffectual to save him from the
operation of the rule. And the fact that the
representative paid the full value of the property is immaterial, as is the fact that he does
not derive any individual profit from the purchase."
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See also Keys v. Keets, 68 F.2d 409, 410 {C.A.D.C.
1933); Turner v. Kirkwood, 49 F.2d 590, 594 (10th Cir.
1931); 34 C.J.S. Executors and Adminis.trators § 599 {1942).
The general rule appears to be that an executor
may not circumvent the rule against sales to himself
by selling to the executor's spouse:
"Executors and administrators cannot evade
the rule against purchasing at their own sales
by the interposition of a third person who
either becomes a purchaser for the benefit of
the executor or administrator, or, after the
purchase, reconveys to the representative. The

rule also prohibits purchase by a spouse of .the
personal representative and by a partnership of

which the executor or administrator is a member." 31 Am Jur 2d Executors and Administrators § 384, pp. 186-187 (emphasis added).

See also Boyd v. Matthews, 388 S.W.2d 102, 106
(Ark. 1965).
The Utah legislature in adopting the provisions
of 75-10-6 seems to have clearly expressed its intent
that no self-dealing by an executor would be permitted. The words that the executor "shall" not "directly or indirectly" purchase, "nor be interested
in any sale" would appear to convey the meaning
that the legislature did not see fit to allow exceptions. For a discussion regarding such statutes we
refer the court to Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2nd Edition, Vol. 2, Sections 341 and 344.
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We commend to the court Section 552, Bancroft's
Probate Practice, 2nd Edition, and particularly the

quote from the Oklahoma court found on page 72
of Vol. 3 which reads:
"We admit that there may be individual instances where the law may work a hardship and
injustice upon parties who have acted in good
faith and dealt fairly in the transaction, but
rather than lay down a rule that might open up
a field of fraud and give an opportunity to
designing persons to plunder and exploit trust
estates, we deem it wise to let the door remain
closed and the statute unqualified." Chastain v.
Pender, 152 P. 833.

See also the Oklahoma case of Burton v. Compton,
150 P. 1080. There a guardian of a minor sold his
wards real estate to his own wife. The Oklahoma
court held that the deed is void, regardless of the
absence of fraud, the adequacy of price, or the apparent regularity of the proceedings. It points out
that such transactions are prohibited by statute and
condemned by public policy. The court quotes the
Kansas court in Frazier v. ]eakins, 68 P. 24:
"The opportunities which are open to an unfaithful trustee to advantage himself out of the
trust estate are so many and so tempting, and
the condition of the beneficiary in the trust
ordinarily so helpless and confiding, that the
law gives warning in advance against all transactions out of which it is possible for the former
to make gain at the expense of the latter."
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The Oklahoma court then said, " ... for this reason
the legislature has fixed this statutory rule which
removes both the temptation and opportunity to do
wrong."
In the First Cause of Action of their Complaint
plaintiffs allege that on September 17, 1951, defendant Edith S. Clinger, as Executrix, sold estate
property to her husband, defendant Herschel J.
Clinger. They allege that defendant, Edith S. Clinger, did not disclose to the court in either the contract of purchase or the petition for confirmation
that defendants were husband and wife and that defendant Edith S. Clinger owned an interest in the
property sold. Finally in paragraph 11 of the First
Cause of Action plaintiffs allege the sale violated
Section 75-10-6 of the Utah Code. (R. 3-4) Defendants
admitted the sale occurred as alleged, admitted that
neither the contract of sale nor the petition for confirmation informed the court of the defendants' relationship to each other or that defendant Edith S.
Clinger owned an interest in the property sold.
Most significantly, the defendants did not deny that
the conduct alleged in the complaint constituted a
violaion of Section 75-10-6, and by failing to deny,
defendants are deemed to have admitted the same.
Rule 8(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
From the language of the statute, the authorities cited, and the pleadings it is respectfully submitted that the sale by the defendant Edith S.
Clinger as Executrix of the estate property to her
husband, defendant Herschel J. Clinger, constituted
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a violation of Section 75-10-6 of the Code and as a
matter of law, said sale should be set aside to the
extent possible and the defendant, Edith S. Clinger,
should be required to account to and pay damages
to the plaintiffs.
POINT II
THE ACTION OF THE PLAINTIFFS, OR EITHER
OF THEM, IS NOT BARRED BY UTAH STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS, 78-12-19.

78-12-19, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, reads as follows:
"Actions to recover estate sold by executor or
administrator.-No action for the recovery of
any estate sold by an executor or administrator
in the course of any probate proceedings can
be maintained by any heir or other person
claiming under the decedent, unless it is commenced within three years next after such sale.
An action to set aside the sale may be instituted and maintained at any time within three
years from the discovery of the fraud or other
lawful grounds upon which the action is
based." (emphasis added)

78-12-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, reads as follows:
"Minority or disability prevents running of
period .-The two preceding sections shall n_ot
apply to minors or others under any legal disability to sue at the time when the right of
action first accrues but all such persons may

15
commence an action (within the time prescribed in the next succeeding section)."

78-12-21, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides that:
". . . The time during which such disability
continues is not deemed any portion of the
time in this article limited for the commencement of such actions ... "

The foregoing statutes clearly state that where
a cause of action is in a minor, the statute of limitations will not run against him or her during the
period of minority. The minor is held to have the
full statutory period following the removal of the
disability.
Elizabeth, the younger of the two plaintiffs,
commenced this action within the statutory period
after coming of age and also after her discovery of
the fraud or unlawful sale.
The action was not commenced within the
statutory period after Cheryl, the older of the two
plaintiffs, became of age. It was commenced, however, within the statutory period after her discovery
of the fraud or unlawful sale.
2nd Edition, Vol. 3, sections 660-661, argue that statutes limiting the time in
which an heir may bring an action are intended to
protect the purchaser and are available to the purchaser only. And see page 273, Section 659, where
the author states:
Bancroft's Probate Practice,
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"An action to set aside the sale may be insti-

tuted and maintained at any time within three
years from the discovery of the fraud or other
grounds upon which the action is based. But
the foregoing provisions do not apply to minors
or others under legal disability to sue at the
time when the right of action first accrues,
and all such persons may commence an action
at anytime within three years after the removal
of the disability."

If Cheryl's claim were to be disallowed, Elizabeth must still prevail and the sale of such property as still remains in the hands of the defendants
must be set aside. Plaintiffs do not claim the right
to specific recovery of the improved and unimproved Lots in Salina; those parcels have been
sold by the defendants prior to the filing of this
action. Plaintiffs do claim a right to an accounting
for profits and rents pertaining to property still in
the hands of the defendants as well as restoration
of such property as remains in the hands of the defendants.

The responsibility of the defendants to surrender that property which they still hold and the need
for the defendant, Edith S. Clinger, to render a full
account and damages resulting from her self-dealing remains the same in principle and measure of
damage whether one or both of the plaintiffs is permitted to recover. If the action of the Executrix was
improper and is challenged by only one heir, the
wrongdoing Executrix may not retain the fruits of
her improper conduct, but must restore to the
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estate and hence to the heirs all of the benefits
which she may have received and to which she
was not entitled.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS EITHER INDIVIDUALLY OR COLLECTIVELY.

A Minute Entry dated October 2, 1970, by the
trial court indicates:
"Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted, on the authority of Dignan v.
Nelson, 26 Utah 186, approved in Parr v. Zions
Firs.t National Bank, 13 Utah 2d 404." (R. 29)

The lower court's Order Granting Summary
Judgment states:
". . . plaintiffs' action against defendants,
if any, is barred by Section 78-12-19, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, and defendants' motion
for summary judgment of no cause of action
in their favor and against plaintiffs . . . is
granted." (R. 30)

The cases followed by the lower court sustain
the rights of a stranger in possession under a claim
of adverse possession as against the guardian or
heir. It is significant that neither case involved a
claim by an heir against the executor. These cases
come within the well-established rule that:
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"Where the legal title to property belonging
to the estate of an infant is in his general guard-

ian, it has been held that a bar of the statute of
limitations as to the guardian will operate so
as to bar the ward of an action with respect
to the property." 86 A.L.R. 2d 975, § 6 (1962)
(emphasis added).

In the aforementioned A.LR. annotation, Dignan
v. Nelson, 26 Utah 186, 72 P. 936 (1903), the case referred to in the lower court's minute entry, is cited
as authority for the above proposition. Dignan involved an ejectment action where plaintiff had been
the administratrix of the estate and later guardian of
the minor heirs. The heirs were represented in the
suit by the guardian-the defendants were adverse
possessors of the estate property. This Court held
in that case that in adverse possession situations
where the guardian has possession or the right to
the possession of estate property and permits the
statute to run against him, the minor heirs are also
barred by the statute of limitations.
Parr v. Zion's First National Bank, 13 U.2d 404, 375

P.2d 461 (1962), was a suit brought to quiet title to
realty. Intervenors claimed interest in the realty as
heirs of their deceased father. All of the minors' interest in the property of the estate of their deceased
father had been distributed to Utah Savings & Trust
Company as their guardian. During the entire guardianship period of some thirteen years prior to discharge the plaintiffs were in adverse possession.
This court held:
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"The guardian had possession or the right to
possession of their property for more than the
required seven years. In Dignan v. Nelson, this
court held that where the statute of limitations
has run against a guardian, the minor heirs
are likewise barred, just as we have held that
when the administrator was barred, the minor
heirs of decedent were barred and for the same
reasons."

Both Parr and Dignan cite as authority for their
holdings the earlier case of Jenkins v. Jensen, 24 Utah
108, 66 P. 773 (1901). In that ruling case the Utah
Supreme Court pointed out the general rule to be
that limitations do not run against a trust but that
this does not apply in an action by or against a third
person. The Jenkins v. Jensen case was an action
against a third person, not a party to the trust. The
court pointed out that under Utah Statutes the administrator had the exclusive right to the possession
of real property belonging to the estate and had the
right to bring suit to recover any real property belonging to the estate held adversely by others. It
further noted that "by the laws of 1884 possession
of the heir is made subject to the possession of the
administrator for the purpose of administration."
Said the Court:
". . . it must be remembered that this is not
an action between the administrator and
guardian on one side, and one claiming as heir
on the other, but is an action between one
claiming as heir to an estate, on the one hand,
and strangers to the estate, on the other."
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It must readily be apparent that the case of
Jenkins vs. Jensen, supra, as well as the two later cases
cited by the court in its ruling on the Motion for
Summary Judgment stand only for the proposition
that where an administrator or guardian had right
to the possession of real property and an adverse
interest was set up for the necessary statutory
period of time so that the administrator or guardian
had lost its right to possession the wards or minor
heirs would likewise be barred.
Plaintiffs have no quarrel with the holdings of
Jenkins, Parr or Dignan since and insofar as they apply
to situations where the guardian is in possession of
or has legal title to or right to possession of the
estate property. However, Appellant respectfully
submits the trial court erred in applying those cases
to the case at bar because in the instant case, unlike
Jenkins, Parr or Dignan the legal guardian did not at
any time have possession, right to possession or
title to the property sold. The guardian of plaintiffs
herein had not been appointed at the time the
Sevier properties were sold by the defendant Executrix.
For limitation of action purposes there is a crucial distinction depending on whether the legal
title or right of action is in the minor heir or the
guardan. Dignan, Parr and Seeton 6 of the annotation
in 86 A.LR. 2d 975 all state that when legal title to
estate property is in the general guardian, the statute of limitation as to the guardian also bars the
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heirs. But when title or right of action is in the minor
heirs a different rule applies. Section 5 of the aforementioned A.LR. Zd annotation states:
"As a general rule it is held that where the
legal title or right of action is in the infant,
the statute of limitations does not run against
him during his minority, although a general
guardian has been appointed, and that suit may
be instituted by him within the statutory period after reaching his majority." 86 A.L.R. 2d
970, § 5.

Counsel for appellants have found no Utah
cases which involve limitation of actions questions
when the title or right of action is in the minor heir.
However, in Aronson v. Bank of America National Trust &
Savings Association, 42 Cal. App. 2d 710, 109 P.Zd 1001
(1914) the California Court indicated that it is generally held that the appointment of a general guardian has no effect upon the tolling of the statute of
limitations as to a cause of action accruing or vesting in a minor.

In In re Sheehan's Estate, 290 Ill.App. 551, 9 N.E. 2d
63 (1937), the guardian of a minor, as guardian, purchased a note secured by a trust deed on the ward's
estate. The guardian attempted to recover on the
note but a defense of the statute of limitations was
raised, which defense alleged that the statute
barred the guardian, and thereby, the ward. It appeared that the title to the note in question was
never in the guardian, but remained in the minor.
The Court held the minor was not barred, noting:
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"It is unnecessary to further discuss the
rule urged as applicable here that a minor is
barred by limitations when his legal representative is barred, except to state that we have
carefully examined all the authorities cited and
find that this rule is applicable only where the
legal title to the res is in the legal representative or trustee." 9 N.E.2d at 65-66.

The Utah cases of Dignan and Parr relied upon by
the lower court in basing its summary judgment as
well as the earlier case of Jenkins v. Jensen all are concerned with action by minor heirs or wards against
strangers to the estate, all are concerned with adverse possession by a stranger not fraud or selfdealing by a trustee, and in each the right of action
was in the trustee rather than the minors.
At the present case before the court, Mr. Frandsen was never recognized by Edith as the guardian
of the estate of the minor heirs. The property was
never distributed to him. He never had possession
or the right to possession of said property. No
statute could have run against him as guardian and
therefore could not have run against the wards.
At the time the property was sold plaintiffs as
minor heirs were entitled to that property and those
rights were personal to them, subject only to the
right of the defendant, Edith S. Clinger, to administer that property as Executrix and trustee for their
benefit.
Statutory cause of action herein accrued to the
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minor heirs as must be seen from the following
statutes, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended:
75-10-4:

Misconduct of personal representative-Liability.
-If there is any neglect or misconduct in the
proceedings of the executor or administrator in
relation to any sale by which any person interested
in the es.fate suffers damage, the party aggrieved
may recover the same in an action upon the bond
of the executor or administrator, or otherwise.
(emphasis added)

75-10-23:

Fraudulent sales-liability.-Any executor or administrator who fraudulently sells any real estate
of a decedent contrary to or otherwise than under
the provisions of this chapter is liable in double
the value of the land sold, as liquidated damages,
to be recovered in an action by the person having
an estate of inheritance therein. (emphasis added)

75-14-23:

Correction of mistakes in settlements.-Mistakes
in settlement may be corrected at any time before final settlement and discharge, and after
that time by an action in equity, on such showing as will justify the interference of the court.

78-12-19:

Actions to recover estate sold by executor or administrator.-No action for the recovery of any
estate sold by an executor or administrator in the
course of any probate proceeding can be maintained by any heir or other person claiming under
the decedent, unless it is commenced within three
years next after such sale. An action to set aside
the sale may be instituted and maintained at any
time within three years from the discovery of
the fraud or other lawful grounds upon which the
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action is based. (emphasis added)

78-12-20:

Minority or disability prevents running of period.
-The two preceding sections shall not apply to
minors or others under any legal disability to sue
at the time when the right of action first accrues
but all such persons may commence an action
(within the time prescribed in the next succeeding section).

78-12-21:

Disabilities enumerated-Time of not reckoned.-

(!) * * *

(2) *
(3) *

* *
* *

The time during which such disability continues
is not deemed any portion of the time in this
article limited for the commencement of such
actions or the making of such entry or defense.

CONCLUSION
The cause of action in the case now before the
court accrued to the plaintiffs during their minority.
Their father who was subsequently appointed their
general guardian but never acted as such never at
any time was given title, possession or control of
the estate left to them by their mother. The defendant Edith S. Clinger at all times following the
death of the mother of the plaintiffs continued to
act as executor of the estate of the deceased mother
and de facto guardian and trustee of the property
of the plaintiffs during their respective minorities.
At no time did a cause of action vest in the guardian
father of the plaintiffs. The cause of action having
accrued to the plaintiffs during their minority ac-
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cording to the statute they had three years following their attaining of their majority to call the executrix to account and to recover the property sold
in the fraudulent sale.
Summary Judgement for defendants should be
set aside and vacated. Property still held by the defendants (one-half interest in 18.6 acres of farm land
in Sevier County and nine shares of water stock)
should be restored to the estate and hence to the
heirs, plaintiffs herein, and the defendants should
account for all rents and profits. For those properties
which cannot be restored, the defendant Edith
Clinger, should pay twice their value pursuant to
the provisions of 75-10-23, Utah Code Annotated,
(1953) as amended.
Respectfully submitted,
R. M. CHILD and
JAMES L. WILDE for
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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